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I. INTRODUCTION
F or the past three decades the negotiating framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has provided member na-
tions with successive opportunities for the reduction of traditional barri-
ers to international trade. The main target of these negotiations has been
tariffs. While the governments of the industrialized nations labored to-
ward freer trade in a series of major negotiating rounds,1 however, the
durability of the resulting arrangements was tested by a number of exter-
nal shocks. Two such shocks were the collapse of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem which initiated the transition from a system of pegged exchange rates
to a managed float of major currencies, and the substantial increase in oil
prices by the OPEC cartel.
The number of industries in the developed countries which found
themselves ostensibly incapable of meeting the challenges of an invigo-
rated world-wide competition was even more serious. This incapacity was
aggravated by Japan's rapid rise as a fierce competitor in a number of
industries. Not too surprisingly, governments came under increasing po-
litical pressure to aid these industries. Governments responded by experi-
menting with a vast array of policies, most of which fall under the head-
ing of "non-tariff barriers."'2 These "non-tariff barriers" run counter to
the spirit, if not the letter, of GATT. Nevertheless, non-tariff barriers
have become an integral and growing factor influencing patterns of world
trade.3
Frank Tracy Carlton Professor of Economics, Case Western Reserve University.
Of these negotiations, the Kennedy Round (1962-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79)
resulted in the most significant tariff cuts; during the Tokyo Round efforts were also made
to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. For a complete summary See Complex Conclusions of
Tokyo Round Add Up to Framework for Future Trade, IMF SURVEY 133-37 (May 7, 1979).
The classic treatise is R.E. BALDWIN, NoNTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1970); See also Ray, Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the U.S. and
Abroad, 63 REV. oF ECON. AND STATISTICS 161-68 (1981).
3 The evolution of national policies can be traced in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS (All vols).
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The American steel industry, which has been increasingly threatened
by import competition, is an illustration of this principle. The U.S. gov-
ernment's efforts to provide relief to the U.S. steel industry is a near per-
fect example of the evolution of patchwork protective measures created in
an atmosphere of domestic, as well as international, bargaining and com-
promise.4 The steel industry has been vocal in its demands for special
consideration on a number of grounds. Its primary demand calls for time
in which to upgrade capital stock as a precondition to a return to full
international competitiveness. 5
There has been discussion elsewhere of the efficacy of a strategy of
piecemeal innovation as a means for improving the performance of the
frequently antiquated plants of the large integrated steel producers.6 A
number of public and private studies have analyzed the reasons, and pos-
sible remedies for the steel industry's malaise.7 This article will discuss
some implications of the most recent experiment in protection, the Trig-
ger Price Mechanism (TPM). Although the workings of the TPM have
been the subject of intense scrutiny," critics have paid inadequate atten-
tion to one feature of the mechanism which, if strictly applied or ex-
tended to other sectors of the economy, might have astonishing conse-
quences for this country's role as a leader in the movement toward trade
liberalization.
If one measures the success of almost a decade and a half of sundry
protective policies by the most obvious yardstick, their ability to curb the
penetration of American markets by foreign steel producers, the results
are discouraging. In 1960, imports accounted for approximately 5 percent
4 The United States has not been alone, of course, in giving succor to an ailing steel
industry. Indeed, the industry's case for protection has been based at least in part on the
claim that governmental support in various forms gave foreign firms an "unfair" advantage.
See AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE, STEEL AT THE CROSSROADS: THE AMERICAN STEEL
INDUSTRY IN THE 1980'S (1980). For a review of government policies See FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL
RIVALS: TRENDS AND FACTORS DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 310-471 (1977).
See AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 33-38.
B. GOLD, G. ROSEGGER & M.G. BOYLAN, EVALUATING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 117-
209 (1980).7See, e.g., COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABLITY, A STUDY OF STEEL PRICES (1975); H.
Mueller and K. Kawahito, Steel Industry Economics: A Comparative Analysis of Structure,
Conduct and Performance (Jan. 1978) (report prepared for the Japan Steel Information
Center); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, TECHNOLOGY
AND STEEL INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS (1930); R.W. CRANDALL, THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY IN
RECURRENT CRISIS (1981).
8 McCormack, The Reinstated Steel Trigger Price Mechanism: Reinforced Barrier to
Import Competition, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 289-338 (1980); J. Dirlam & H. Mueller, Import
Restraints and Reindustrialization: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry (1981). (Confer-
ence Paper, Business and Economic Research Center, Middle Tennessee State University);
CRANDALL, supra note 7, at 103-15.
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of apparent supply;9 in 1970, their share had risen to 14 percent;10 and by
1981 imports had captured in excess of 20 percent of the market." In
some product categories, import shares vastly exceed these averages for
all steel mill products; and in some regions, such as the Pacific Coast
states, import penetration was much greater than is suggested by the data
for the economy as a whole.
This article first presents a simple model of the TPM's economic ef-
fects, followed by a summary review of the policy background and his-
tory. Finally this article will consider the inherent contradictions in the
TPM concept which not only raises serious normative-theoretical ques-
tions, but which also doomed both episodes of the experiment to failure
in practice.
II. THE EFFECTS OF PRICE-FIXING ON TRADE: A MODEL
The goal of any protective policy presumably is to reduce the com-
petitiveness of foreign rivals in a country's home market or, as the indus-
tries to be protected are more likely to put it, to increase their competi-
tiveness to the level where rivalry is "fair" . The number of policy tools
available to governments for this purpose is large, especially if adminis-
trations are not constrained by considerations of consistency in the trad-
ing game's several playing fields.
Economists generally concede that the theoretical case for completely
unfettered international trade in goods and services becomes at least
equivocal in a "second-best" world, one in which distortions between the
private and social benefits and costs of economic activity are the rule
rather than the exception.' 2 Normative issues then revolve around the se-
lection of the most efficient policy tool, the measure that achieves the
desired goal of protection, while creating a minimum of additional distor-
tions.'3 However, economists recognize that their counsel in this respect
may carry little weight in the rough and tumble of the political process,
where efficiency is but a low ranking criterion for success.
Given this observation, the appeal of price-fixing as a means of curb-
ing foreign competition is to permit imports to enter the country only at
"fair" prices, above those that would prevail under freely competitive
conditions. Price-fixing has the seeming virtues of simplicity, equity, de-
terminateness, and transparency. However, price-fixing is likely to create
actual distortions substantially greater than those implicit in other poli-
9 AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTrruTE, ANNUAL STATISTIcAL REPORT (1960).
10 Id. (1970).
11 Id. (1981).
,2 See P.H. LINDERT AND C.P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 138-48 (1982).
3 Id. at 153-75.
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cies. Implementation of the TPM involves price-fixing on a grand scale.
Figure 1 presents one of the standard models of international trade
theory, adapted for demonstrating the effect of government mandated
import prices above the world market price for a commodity. 14 The figure
shows United States demand for steel mill products, United States do-
mestic supply, and the price Pf at which steel can be purchased from the
rest of the world under free-trade conditions."5
By focusing initially on just these parts of the diagram, we can ana-
lyze the two extreme possibilities, complete protection, and complete free
trade. Under the former condition, the price would be Pp and the quanti-
ty supplied and demanded, OQp. If the market were open to free trade,
non-competitive domestic plants, those whose marginal costs of produc-
tion are above Pf, would be forced out of business. The remaining com-
petitive plants would supply the quantity OQ'd, with the rest of the effec-
tive demand at price Pf, the quantity QldQ1m, being satisfied by imports.
Assume now that the United States has an ad valorem tariff on steel
imports, but that this tariff is claimed to provide inadequate protection to
the domestic industry. A whole host of arguments in favor of further
curbing imports may be brought to the fray, including the claim that the
price Pf is "unfairly low" because it resulted from export subsidies by
foreign governments or from outright dumping.16 Yielding to these argu-
ments, the government sets a minimum import price Pt for foreign steel
with appropriate sanctions for violations of the pricing rule. The tariff is
now assessed on the basis of this price, yielding a total price to domestic
consumers of steel mill products equal to Pt. Under these conditions, do-
mestic production will expand to quantity OQ 2d, and imports will be re-
duced to the quantity Q2dQ 2 m
.
Total effective demand for steel mill products will be substantially
lower than it would have been under free trade or with the fixed-rate
tariff only. The higher price will, to a greater or lesser extent, affect all
those commodities for whose production steel is an essential input mate-
rial. The first of these effects is obvious and intended, the second an un-
desirable by-product of one industry's protection.
"' The concept of a single "world market price" is strictly a heuristic device. Prices may
vary considerable from country to country, and price is not the only consideration guiding
purchasing decisions. Furthermore, the model abstracts from transportation costs and other
factors.
' The assumption of a perfectly price-elastic world supply of steel mill products to a
market as large as the United States may be unrealistic, but it does no violence to the
substance of my argument. Indeed, the same assumption has been made even in an attempt
to derive empirical estimates of the cost of protection. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
supra note 4, at 567.
'6 For the record of the American steel industry's antidumping complaints, see McCor-
mack, supra note 8, at 293-302.
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Reliance on the dual policy tools, tariff cum trigger price, has an ad-
ditional undesirable consequence; foreign producers receive a rent equal
to the cross-hatched rectangle R, as a result of the trigger price; tariff
revenues of the government are limited to the amount represented by rec-
tangle T.17 The economist asks: if an industry is to be protected, why give
away potential tariff revenues to foreigners in the form of additional prof-
its? An "equivalent tariff" in the amount PfP't would have the same pro-
tective effect, but revenues equal to the sum of the two rectangles, R and
T, would accrue to the government.
The answer to this question must be sought in the realities of inter-
national political relations. The spirit of GATT frowns upon tariff in-
creases, while it seems to wink at the imposition of less traditional protec-
tive measures. In fact, one of the reasons the U.S. government opted for
the TPM was that any other form of restrictive policy, including the im-
position of countervailing duties under the anti-dumping provisions,
would have been more harmful to this country's position in the Tokyo
Round of GATT negotiations.
One final point, not directly deducible from the diagram but crucial
to further discussion, must be made: under a regime of floating exchange
rates the effectiveness of protection provided by the trigger price, denom-
inated in U.S. dollars, will change as the value of the dollar in terms of
foreign currencies changes. A rise in the dollar's value, equivalent to a
decline of the dollar price of foreign currencies, and therefore of foreign
commodities, will make imports more attractive, and vice versa.
The causes of exchange-rate fluctuations are manifold and need not
concern us here. Nor is it important that intervention by national mone-
tary authorities in the exchange market, "management" of the float, may
mitigate the actual behavior of rates. The existence, at any given point in
time, of a single spot exchange rate enables private decision-makers to
make international comparisons among commodity prices, denominated
in their respective national currencies. This condition is a sine qua non if
patterns of international trade are to reflect approximately the competi-
tive advantages of the countries participating in trade.18
III. THE Two TPM EPISODES - A BRIEF HISTORY
After a brief period of prosperity during 1973 and 1974, marked by
", The respective magnitudes of these effects depend on the price elasticities of the
supply and demand schedules. Thus, for example, if domestic supply were highly price-
elastic, even a small increase in the effective price would draw a large increment of domesti-
cally-produced steel into the market, and vice versa.
" Indeed, the enforcement of multiple exchange-rate systems by countries is generally
regarded as the form of distortion that results in the greatest misallocation of world re-
sources. See M.E. KRININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONoMics: A POLICY APPROACH 155-56 (1979).
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high rates of capacity utilization and respectable profitability, the Ameri-
can steel industry relapsed into stagnation. Imports continued to expand,
and by 1977 the industry's condition had become thoroughly depressed;
closings of marginal facilities and near-zero profits signaled trouble for
the large integrated producers. Import competition had a twofold effect:
it captured increasing proportions of the total tonnages sold, and it
caused domestic producers to engage in defensive discounting from their
posted price quotations.19
The plant closings and concomitant lay-offs served as a catalyst for
the industry and the United Steel Workers' efforts to obtain governmen-
tal relief. The formation of a "Steel Caucus" in Congress, involving ap-
proximately 200 legislators from impacted districts, put additional pres-
sure on the Administration to take some form of action.20 The
international situation was delicate, however; the Tokyo Round of negoti-
ations was at a critical stage, and resort to tariff increases, under
whatever guise, was out of the question.21 Renewal of the strategy of per-
suading foreign steel producers to restrict their sales in the United States
by setting "voluntary" quotas would have seriously undermined the bar-
gaining position of the United States. Unilateral imposition of quantita-
tive restraints on steel imports would have been even more damaging.22
The Carter Administration, avoiding any overt commitment, took
what appeared to be the innocuous step of encouraging the American
firms to make full use of the opportunities to submit anti-dumping com-
plaints. The response was anything but innocuous. In the fall of 1977, 16
separate complaints were filed involving producers in seven countries,
with further actions threatened. 23 Even if only a portion of these petitions
were successful, relations with the countries involved, which included
some of the United States' staunchest European allies, would have been
severely strained. Recognizing this danger, President Carter appointed an
interagency task force chaired by Anthony M. Solomon, the Under Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. 24 The group was charged with
the task of analyzing the steel industry's competitive position and with
making recommendations for remedial action.
The Solomon Committee, established in October 1977, set what is
probably a record for swift work by a bureaucratic body by submitting its
1 A comparison of the price quotations summarized in METAL STATISTICS (1959-80)
with the statistics on average Irealized prices for various product categories. [CRANDALL,
supra note 7,at 159] gives an approximate indication of the extent of discounting in any
given year.
20 CRANDAL, supra note 7, at 42.
2 McCormack, supra note 8, at 303.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 304.
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final report to the President on December 6, 1977.25 Not too surprisingly,
in view of this haste, the document was somewhat short on analysis. Nev-
ertheless, the report provided "reasons for the Administration's program"
and recommended a host of policies, "relief from unfair trade practices"
being the centerpiece.2
6
The basic underlying rationale for the report's recommendations was
a criticism of procedures under the Antidumping Act. These procedures
were labeled as "too cumbersome to provide prompt relief from sudden
surges of imports that might cause injury to an American industry. '27 On
the other hand, it was contended that, if a dumping finding is in fact
made, "its effect may be to staunch all imports of the product con-
cerned. '28 Therefore, the report recommended that the Department of
the Treasury set up a system of trigger prices, based on the full costs of
production including appropriate capital charges of steel mill products by
the most efficient foreign steel producers (currently the Japanese steel
industry) which would be used as a basis for monitoring imports of steel
into the United States and for initiating accelerated antidumping investi-
gations with respect to imports priced below the trigger prices.2 9
The most significant rule for determining trigger prices provided that
"trigger prices will be adjusted quarterly to reflect intervening changes in
costs of production components and in currency values."30 Were it not for
this provision, the whole mechanism could have been claimed to be a
temporary procedural device for removing the initiative for antidumping
complaints from individual firms and placing it in the hands of govern-
ment. The transitory nature of the TPM was emphasized by the state-
ment that, "when conditions warrant, the system will be terminated and
the more traditional procedures restored." 1 The acceleration of proceed-
ings was to result from the expectation that if imports below the trigger
price entered the country, the Commerce Department would initiate a
formal investigation "within a matter of weeks, ' 32 and conclude action
within 60 to 90 days, as contrasted with the more than 13 months typi-
cally required under normal procedure.
3 3
'5 The full text can be found in Report to the President- A Comprehensive Program for
the Steel Industry, reprinted in Hearings on the Administration's Comprehensive Program
for the Steel Industry before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and
Means, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
26 Id. at 12.
2" Id. at 15.
2 Id.
29 Id. at 16 (parentheses in original).
1* Id. at 18 (italics supplied).
SI Id. at 23.
32 Id. at 19.
33 Id.
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In exchange for the protection afforded by the TPM, U.S. producers
agreed to drop their pending antidumping complaints and to refrain from
filing new petitions.3 4 The mechanism was formally installed in January
1978 and became fully operative during the second quarter of the same
year. The extent to which TPM was a political compromise was demon-
strated in Congressional hearings held on January 25 and 26, 1978. None
of the affected parties, whether domestic producers or importers, re-
garded it as a solution to the steel problem 3 5
In practice, the TPM rapidly transcended its suggested role of pro-
viding a set of "reference prices." To no economist's surprise, these refer-
ence prices became the de facto minimum prices. If foreign sellers wanted
to avoid the risks of government intervention, they did not do business at
or below these prices. As a result, during the first year of TPM's opera-
tion, overall import prices rose by about 10 per cent while defensive dis-
counting by domestic producers slowed down considerably.3 6
Throughout 1978 and 1979, the mechanism appeared to work as in-
tended. By early 1980, however, its effectiveness weakened, for reasons
suggested in Section IV. In March 1980, U.S. Steel Corporation broke
ranks and filed an antidumping complaint against producers in five Euro-
pean countries. Thereafter the Administration suspended the TPM on
the grounds that it could not simultaneously enforce trigger prices and
prosecute individual complaints.3 7 When it became apparent that the In-
ternational Trade Commission might find injury because of sales at less
than "fair value," the European Economic Community threatened retalia-
tory action if the United States imposed antidumping duties.3 8
After protracted domestic and international negotiations, a revised
version of the TPM was re-instituted in October of 1978, and U.S. Steel
once again agreed to withdraw its complaints.3 " Aside from some tighten-
ing of rules and operating procedures, the mechanism remained un-
changed in terms of its economic impact. However, re-institution was ac-
companied by a substantial increase in the mandated trigger prices. This
increase seems to have been the result of bargaining rather than of any
3, McCormack, supra note 8, at 310.
" See testimony in Hearings, supra note 22, at 43-290.
36 CRANDALL, supra note 7, at 109-10; H. MUELLER, THE COMPETITIVNESS OF THE U.S.
STEEL INDUSTRY AFTER THE NEW TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM 1-3 (December 1980). (Mono-
graph Series, No. 25, Business and Economic Research Center, Middle Tennessee State Uni-
versity); see also the data on domestic prices and trigger prices in Figure 2, below.
17 CRANDALL, supra note 7, at 43. He also attributes the temporary "success" of the first
TPM episode to the fact that during 1978-80 "the Japanese were limiting their exports to
the United States to about 6 million tons a year per an apparently informal agreement with
U.S. trade officials." Id.
'8 Dirlam and Mueller, supra note 8, at 9.
'9 Id.; See also McCormack, supra note 8, at 336-39.
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sudden upward leap in the reference base, the Japanese costs of
production.
Once more there followed a year of relative tranquility, though from
the U.S. producers' viewpoint, there was no abatement of the import
threat. With a worldwide slump in steel sales and widespread unemploy-
ment in many traditional steel-producing countries, this period was
marked by a virtual suspension of free trade in steel throughout the in-
dustrialized world.40 Recurrent "surges" in imports, precisely the phe-
nomenon the TPM was supposed to prevent, kept the American industry
restless. Early in November 1981, U.S. Steel again rattled the system by
announcing that it would file antidumping complaints against producers
in nine foreign countries.
41
In an apparent effort to save the TPM and forestall individual com-
pany initiatives, the Commerce Department itself instituted antidumping
investigations against five foreign countries.42 The effort was for naught,
because in January 1982, seven American steel producers filed complaints
against firms in twelve different countries. Once again the government
was forced to suspend operation of the TPM, and the second episode
came to an end.43
IV. THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INCOMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES
The TPM, a de facto price-fixing scheme, was an inefficient policy
tool on theoretical grounds. TPM not only failed to achieve its ultimate
objective of curbing imports, but it also broke down on two separate
occasions.
Given the persistence of other demonstrably inefficient government
programs," we may well ask why the TPM failed so dismally. A conten-
tion that the government could not both enforce an across-the-board sys-
tem for assuring steel imports at "fair" prices and accommodate the right
of individual firms to submit antidumping complaints may or may not be
valid. Further McCormack 5 claims that the whole arrangement was in-
compatible with existing trade law. But even without discussing the spe-
cific legal implications of this particular case, ample historical evidence of
the fragility of "informal" agreements, such as the steel companies' con-
40 S.A.B. Page, The Revival of Protectionism and Its Consequences for Europe, 26
JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 17-40 (1981).
41 No.2 U.S. Steel to Sue 9 Nations Over Imports, Considers Billion-Dollar-Plus
Purchase, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1981, at 4, col. 2.
42 Complaints on Imports of Steel, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
43 7 Steel Firms Open War on Dumpers, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 12, 1982, at 1, col. 1;
Lawsuits Escalate Steel War, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 19, 1982, at 1.
" See W.S. PEIRCE, BUR AUCRATC FAILURE AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 271-93 (1981).
4' McCormack, supra note 8, at 329-31.
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sent to abstain from antidumping action in exchange for the institution of
the TPM, exists.
From the economist's perspective another interesting question re-
mains: Why did the scheme operate with the support of the domestic
firms for some period and then break down? Given the general climate of
give-and-take in which the TPM seems to have been designed, it would
be difficult to argue that a sudden burst of malice or frustration caused
its ostensible beneficiaries to sabotage the policy.
46
One answer can be found in the inherent contradiction of the TPM's
avowed objectives: to establish a floor under import prices based on the
most efficient foreign producers' costs of production and to adjust this
floor for fluctuations in the value of the U.S. dollar. The contradiction
derives primarily from a simple theoretical consideration. If pursuit of
both these objectives were taken seriously, if the regulating agency were
able to calculate foreign costs of production accurately,47 and if the regu-
lating agency made fully compensatory adjustments for changes in the
exchange rate, then the very bases for trade would be undermined. Ap-
plied to all commodities across the board, implementation of the two
principles would eliminate any reasons for private parties to engage in
transactions with private parties in other countries.48
Real-life trade policy is not formulated with undue regard for simple
theoretical considerations, particularly not when it comes to protecting
import-competing industries.49 The economic implications of a policy are
mitigated and obscured when it is applied only to select groups of com-
modities. A second aspect of the TPM's inherent contradictions is the
selective adjustment of import prices to compensate for exchange-rate
fluctuations which lead, ipso facto, to a system of well-concealed multiple
exchange rates. Thus, for example, an increase in the trigger price caused
by the dollar's rise in the world's free exchange market is equivalent to a
devaluation of the "steel-import dollar," which, however, leaves the value
of the dollar unchanged for purposes of other imports. Should the princi-
46 As I hope to show below, explanation of the steel firms' behavior also does not seem
to require the assumption of a (conspiratorial?) "protectionist game plan." J. Dirlam & H.
Mueller, supra note 8, at 10.
47 These calculations were to be based on data supplied periodically by the Japanese
Ministry of Trade and Industry. McCormack, supra note 8, at 304. Anyone who has at-
tempted such calculations, especially for products with pervasive join-cost characteristics,
will view the accuracy of published figures with some sense of skepticism.
48 The analogy with proposals for a "scientific tariff," aimed at eliminating wage differ-
entials among countries, is striking. See KREININ, supra note 16, at 303-06.
49 I want to reaffirm that I am not making an argument against protection per se, for




ple also be applied to automobiles, machine tools, or television sets?5" In
view of virtually universal governmental interferences with steel trade,
the question may appear no more than rhetorical. While the setting of an
implicitly different rate for steel mill products might be shrugged off, ex-
tension of this type of protection to other import-competing industries
surely would invite retaliation and perhaps even provoke economic
warfare. 51
Anyone familiar with patterns of governmental response to conflict-
ing special-interest groups such as domestic producers, foreign producers
and their governments, and importers, might venture some hypotheses.
First, the setting of actual trigger prices soon became divorced from fluc-
tuations in foreign costs of production and in exchange rates, and at least
partially sensitive to the need to pacify vocal domestic interests while at
the same time not unduly antagonizing foreign governments.5 2 Secondly,
an asymmetry in the application of the TPM's dual adjustment rules was
likely to develop. The steel industry would no doubt find it possible to
"live with" trigger prices as long as the value of the dollar declined. Do-
mestic producers probably would chafe under the mechanism's strictures
whenever the dollar appreciated and feel that increases in trigger prices
were insufficient to offset this cheapening of steel imports.
Only the record of actual price-setting deliberations could provide
some clues as to how far such considerations influenced the process. Short
of conducting a massive econometric test which might reveal some clear-
cut patterns of behavior, one has to settle for suggestive evidence. Figure
2 shows the relevant information for one product category, hot rolled
sheets in the West Coast market, one of the four differentiated regions
established for purposes of setting prices under the TPM.5 3 The diagram
shows, on a quarterly basis, the evolution of U.S. quoted domestic prices
and the corresponding trigger prices.54 In addition Figure 2 also shows an
"exchange-rate-adjusted trigger price," calculated to answer the question:
50 Multiple exchange rates, whether mandated overtly or concealed in other measures,
have a long-standing history as tools of economic exploitation; the system was brought to
perfection by Nazi Germany, before World War I. See Y. Wu, ECONOMIC WARFARE 120-31
(1952).
" The proposition has an analog on the export side: subsidies or other aids to exporting
industries are equivalent to a lowering of the price of a country's currency for the commodi-
ties involved. Id. at 131-39.
'2 Dirlam and Mueller, supra note 8, at 10-11; CRANDALL, supra note 7, at 1-3.
5' Hot-rolled sheets are among the major product categories imported. In recent years,
their volume of imports was exceeded only by that of cold-rolled sheets. See AMERICAN IRON
AND STEEL INSTITUTE, supra note 9.
U' Calculation of the final trigger price involves a "base price," to which import duty,
transportation charges, brokerage fees, and certain other "extras" are added. For examples
see, Hearings, supra note 22, at 132-36.
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how would the initial trigger price, announced in January 1978,55 have
behaved over the next four years if it had been affected only by the ex-
change-fluctuation component of the TPM rule, by changes in the dollar/
yen exchange rate?
That trigger prices and quoted domestic prices moved upward more
or less in lock-step is not suprising,56 though the direction of causation is
arguable.57 We may note parenthetically that only once, during the third
quarter of 1979, was the trigger price reduced by a small amount. It prob-
ably can't be concluded that increases in the Japanese costs of production
always outweighed appreciations of the dollar.
The behavior of the exchange-rate-adjusted trigger price supports
this thesis. The price reflects a sharp decline of the dollar in the second
half of 1978. From then until the first quarter of 1980, the dollar appreci-
ated substantially, reducing the hypothetical trigger price to its original
level. At this time, in March 1978, U.S. Steel fied the antidumping com-
plaints that terminated the first TPM episode.
By the third quarter of 1978, the dollar had deteriorated once again,
and in October of that year the TPM was re-instituted with a massive
increase in the official trigger price for hot-rolled sheets, (as well as for
other products). Another sharp rise followed in the second quarter of
1981. In the meantime, however, a renewed appreciation of the dollar had
begun to drive the adjusted trigger price down to another low, barely
above the actual trigger price of the third quarter of 1978. One more time,
this was followed by the threat and then the actuality of antidumping
actions that ended the second episode.
This exercise lends plausibility to the proposition that the TPM
failed because it could not withstand the contradiction of its dual rules in
the face of politico-economic realities. Even if all the normative argu-
ments that can be advanced against price-fixing as a policy tool are set to
one side, the conclusion that the TPM collapsed on its own terms is inevi-
table. The mechanism proved inadequate to the task set for it; rigid ad-
herence to its price-setting criteria was politically unacceptable, and the
actual price-setting failed to satisfy at least one of the parties. What may
have looked like a workable political compromise at the outset fell down
precisely because it was a compromise, in conception as well as in
execution.
Id. at 135.
It has been claimed that imported steel mill products must have a price advantage of
10 per cent or better in order to be attractive to American buyers. See STATEMENT OF KURT
ORBAN ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR IMPORTED STEEL, Id. at 129.
11 If one wanted to attack the steel producers for behaving like traditional oligopolists,
one would contend that they adjusted their prices so as to stay ahead of the triggers. If one
wanted to attack the government for being a political pawn of the steel industry, one would




Steel is an essential input for many of America's manufacturing in-
dustries. In addition, the fortunes of the integrated large-scale producers,
whose plants are heavily concentrated in a few of the country's regions,
are not a matter of political indifference to an elected government and its
bureaucracy. Thus, the special attention steel has received over the past
decade and a half is understandable, in economic as well as political
terms.
Of the various policy tools developed to-protect the industry against
import competition, the TPM proved shortest-lived and least effective.
Its failure may be attributed to the fact that the TPM depended on the
consensus of one of the affected parties, who had legal access to alterna-
tive forms of redress. When the inherent contradictions in TPM's key
rule, the price-adjustment rule, forced the government to walk a thin line
between allaying domestic interests and not antagonizing foreign govern-
ments, compromise solutions to the pricing problem resulted. When the
compromise solutions failed to satisfy the domestic producers, the system
broke down. A truly effective policy for sheltering the industry without
stifling all competition and innovative effort has yet to be found.5s
85 The steel industry, through its trade association, has offered a rationale for its deci-
sion once again to rely on traditional antidumping action instead of the TPM. The Ameri-
can Iron and Steel Institute cites "the 'intolerable' increase in U.S. imports of dumped and
subsidized steel," which are the result of foreign countries' attempts at "exporting their own
unemployment to the United States." Furthermore, it is claimed that efforts of U.S. govern-
ment officials to receive assurances from the European Economic Community of "efforts to
restrain U.S. trade law violations by their steel industries ... were thought by U.S. indus-
try leaders to be unreliable in view of the history of European steel trade practices." See
Steel Companies File Trade Complaints, 1 STMx '82 1-2 (February 1982). This statement,
which reached me after I had written my paper, reinforces my conclusions.
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FIGURE 1. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A TRIGGER PRICE AND TARIFF
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FIGURE 2. QUOTED DOMESTIC PRICES, TRIGGER PRICES, AND EXCHANGE-
RATE-ADJUSTED TRIGGER PRICES FOR HOT-ROLLED SHEETS
(WEST COAST), 1978-1981.
[QUARTERLY AVERAGES]
Sources: METAL STATISTICS 187 (1981); FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN (var. is-
sues); STEEL INDUSTRY QUARTERLY (var. issues); Hearings, supra note 22,
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